Design For Six Sigma with Critical-To-Quality Metrics for Research Investments by Logan, R W
UCRL-TR-214481
Design For Six Sigma with
Critical-To-Quality Metrics for
Research Investments
Roger W. Logan
August 10, 2005
Disclaimer 
 
 This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States 
Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their 
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any 
specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, 
does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United 
States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein 
do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, 
and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of 
California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48. 
 
7/15/2005 11:58 AM UCRL-TR-IM-321696 1 
Copyright © 200x Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.  
 1 
Design for Six Sigma with Critical –To-Quality Metrics for Research Investments 2 
 3 
Roger W. Logan, Cynthia K. Nitta, and Steven K. Chidester 4 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 5 
 6 
Abstract 7 
 8 
Design for Six Sigma (DFSS) has evolved as a worthy predecessor to the application of Six-Sigma 9 
principles to production, process control, and quality. At Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), 10 
we are exploring the interrelation of our current research, development, and design safety 11 
standards as they would relate to the principles of DFSS and Six-Sigma. We have had success in 12 
prioritization of research and design using a quantitative scalar metric for value, so we further 13 
explore the use of scalar metrics to represent the outcome of our use of the DFSS process. We use 14 
the design of an automotive component as an example of combining DFSS metrics into a scalar 15 
decision quantity. We then extend this concept to a high-priority, personnel safety example 16 
representing work that is toward the mature end of DFSS, and begins the transition into Six-Sigma 17 
for safety assessments in a production process. This latter example and objective involves the 18 
balance of research investment, quality control, and system operation and maintenance of high 19 
explosive handling at LLNL and related production facilities. Assuring a sufficiently low 20 
probability of failure (reaction of a high explosive given an accidental impact) is a Critical-To-21 
Quality (CTQ) component of our weapons and stockpile stewardship operation and cost. Our use 22 
of DFSS principles, with quantification and merging of CTQ metrics, provides ways to quantify 23 
clear (preliminary) paths forward for both the automotive example and the explosive safety 24 
example. The presentation of simple, scalar metrics to quantify the path forward then provides a 25 
focal point for qualitative caveats and discussion for inclusion of other metrics besides a single, 26 
provocative scalar. In this way, carrying a scalar decision metric along with the DFSS process 27 
motivates further discussion and ideas for process improvement from the DFSS into the Six-Sigma 28 
phase of the product. We end with an example of how our DFSS-generated scalar metric could be 29 
improved given success of our future research investments in impact safety scenarios. 30 
1 Introduction 31 
Our goal in this work is to use examples to illustrate three key points that provide a linkage 32 
between DFSS, product development, and systems engineering. These points are that: 33 
 34 
1. The DFSS process, when linked to a scalar metric quantity such as the Benefit / Cost 35 
Ratio (BCR), can quantify what might otherwise be a qualitative, judgment based path 36 
forward for research or operations. This quantitative DFSS+BCR defense is not meant 37 
to replace expert judgment; only to augment, focus, and reflect the expert judgment 38 
process in a quantitative way. 39 
2. During DFSS, we must remember that the strings of numbers often come from models 40 
of a process and of physics. Often these models must make do with incomplete physics 41 
and incomplete data. It is very important to take account of this fact of model use and 42 
to quantify model confidence throughout the DFSS process. We will illustrate the 43 
difference this can make in one of our examples. 44 
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3. DFSS should not be viewed as a one-time activity. The DFSS process should be 45 
revisited whenever there is a significant change in knowledge about the physics, 46 
likelihoods, benefits, or consequences of the system or product under consideration. 47 
 48 
Design and new product development often involves qualitative goals and depends on 49 
advances in research and development yet to come to fruition. Because of these and other factors, 50 
the design process will always contain a blend of qualitative and quantitative aspects. The Design 51 
For Six Sigma (DFSS) process is ideally suited to deal with both qualitative and quantitative 52 
aspects, and has the added advantage of a smooth transition into the production phase use of Six-53 
Sigma principles.  DFSS and Six-Sigma began with a very quantitative basis, namely a goal of 54 
nearly-zero defects per million in a product or process. Six-Sigma formally refers to a long term 55 
defect level of less than 4 Defects Per Million (DPM).  56 
There is no special “magic” about DFSS or Six-Sigma, except the benefits of established 57 
goals, adherence to an established, rigorous process, and the combination of qualitative (judgment 58 
based) and quantitative (often reliability and risk based) design and implementation. Several 59 
variants of implementation for DFSS are outlined in (Hu et al, 2004), including: 60 
 61 
IIDOV: Invent, Innovate, Develop, Optimize, Verify 62 
CDOV: Concept, Design, Optimize, Verify 63 
IDDOV: Identify, Define, Develop, Optimize, Verify 64 
DCOV: Define, Characterize, Optimize, Verify 65 
DMADV: Define, Measure, Analyze, Design, Verify 66 
DMAIC: Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, Control 67 
 68 
The latter of the implementations, DMAIC, is typically where the DFSS design and 69 
development process transitions into Six-Sigma production, quality, and defect and cost reduction. 70 
In each of these implementations the “Identify” or “Define” phase is where the Critical-To-Quality 71 
(CTQ) issues are identified, so they can be worked throughout the rest of the DFSS or Six-Sigma 72 
process. It is in this phase where methods such as QFD or Quality Function Deployment (Kogure 73 
and Akao, 1983) are first used to help design and implement the correct process and product. 74 
Usually, there will be more than one “Customer Want” in QFD. For example, in the main example 75 
topic of this paper, we can summarize the “Customer Wants” for impact safety of explosives as: 76 
 77 
1. Provide a quantitative basis for a sufficiently low risk assessment in handling safety. 78 
2. Assess the proper balance of models and experiments needed. 79 
3. Obtain these objectives while minimizing risk and direct cost 80 
2 Does our product justify the use of DFSS and Six-Sigma? 81 
High explosives used in research and designs at LLNL are formulated, designed, and used 82 
with safety as a top priority. There is only a miniscule likelihood of “detonation” of the explosive 83 
during handling or logistics scenarios, but we also wish to assure a sufficiently low likelihood of 84 
even an explosive reaction, such as the reaction shown in the impact test sequence in Figure 1. 85 
Safe handling and testing of high explosives requires a careful balance of explosive handling 86 
and mitigation of the occurrence of scenarios that might lead to an explosive impact, along with 87 
modeling and experimental work to assess the likelihood of an explosive reaction if an accidental 88 
impact did occur. 89 
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 90 
 91 
. 92 
One of our goals should be to suggest a way to capture the outcome of the QFD process (and 93 
the DFSS process as a whole) in a single metric. The metric we will choose is the Benefit / Cost 94 
Ratio (BCR), as described in (Nitta et al, 2004). Quantitative use of the BCR requires that each 95 
term be expressed in dollar equivalents as benefit $B or cost $C.  96 
In a previous work (Nitta et al, 2004), we discussed the issue of explosive impact safety using 97 
a systems engineering construct, and worked our way up a pyramid of activity to the BCR, as 98 
depicted in Figure 2. Our focus for DFSS appears in the “Reliability Methods” layer of the Figure 99 
2 pyramid. However, when the DFSS process is followed, the questions that must be asked and 100 
answered are quantitative but also conceptual in nature and involve far more than reliability 101 
methods. Typically, there is a multidimensional, multidisciplinary systems engineering aspect to 102 
the problem under consideration, and this leads to a multidimensional process for the application 103 
of DFSS principles. 104 
We will show one fairly simple, 105 
self-contained example of the use of 106 
BCR below, with quantitative values, to 107 
convert a multi-disciplinary, multi-108 
dimensional Pareto frontier (Wilson et 109 
al, 2000) into one suitable for the 110 
generation of a scalar BCR. In reality, a 111 
scalar BCR will itself have a range 112 
depending on the probabilistic or 113 
evidence based ranges for the dollar 114 
values involved, and for the benefit $B 115 
weightings given for the various multi-116 
dimensional elements. In the product 117 
design process, a common first-order 118 
simplification is the reduction of the 119 
multi-dimensional components of 120 
mechanical stress and strain (tensors) 121 
into scalar measures called “effective 122 
stress” and “effective strain”. 123 
Combining multi-dimensional customer 124 
wants and Critical-To-Quality (CTQ) 125 
 
 
Figure 1. Explosive Reaction during “Steven Test” (Switzer et al, 2003) for impact safety. 
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elements of a product into a single scalar metric like the BCR is not unlike combining the stress 126 
and strain tensors into scalars; the gain in simplicity must be balanced against the loss of detailed 127 
information. 128 
Today, we might routinely deploy a DFSS process for any such undertaking with 129 
consequences that involve personnel safety, with elements such as QFD and BCR explicitly 130 
included. Over a decade ago, these methods were not the norm in general. However, many of the 131 
elements of DFSS, in a DCOV implementation sense, were carried out in the initial explosives 132 
handling decisions. Even implicitly, the BCR was considered, but only in a qualitative sense. The 133 
benefits of successful, safe operations with explosives were defined goals such as personnel 134 
safety, ability to respond to the weapon system requirements of the DOE and DoD, and providing 135 
data to advance our ability to model accurately with computer codes and models. Any quantitative 136 
analysis of a safety issue is of course complex, and depends on scenarios and assumptions 137 
regarding product value, accident consequences, and other factors. We have examined numerous 138 
complex methods for generating an explosives impact safety BCR, as discussed in (Logan et al, 139 
2005). but for the purpose of following the DFSS process, it is really only necessary to convince 140 
ourselves that our product has, by some measure, a sufficiently positive BCR. A high BCR gives 141 
us “room” for a decrease in $B or an unanticipated increase in $C that might evolve during 142 
product design, development, or deployment.  143 
The point of this short, very simplified narrative about the BCR is that it is desirable to have 144 
quantitative assessments of the BCR during the DFSS process; the BCR can quantify the best 145 
future course and help justify the funds needed. However, even without a quantitative value for the 146 
BCR, we can make several points regarding the application of DFSS to a large undertaking such 147 
as accident safety during explosives handling. The points are that: 148 
 149 
1. There are simple and complex quantifications of a high BCR for assessments and 150 
mitigation measures for explosives handling safety. 151 
2. On a personnel safety and public perception basis alone, we have a situation that compels 152 
the principles of both DFSS and Six-Sigma; and plenty of room for continued R&D 153 
investments to continue to reduce our assessed Pfail. 154 
3. As we continue explosives safety testing and handling and enter the “V” phase of DCOV 155 
or DMADV, the features of the DFSS and then Six-Sigma process and roadmaps can 156 
provide quantitative guidance to future process control and R&D. 157 
3 The Multi-Dimensional Pareto Frontier 158 
In assuring safety during high explosive handling and logistics processes, several CTQ issues 159 
are faced at the same time. For example: 160 
1. We need to determine the types of impact scenarios that exist, and determine the ones can 161 
be cost-effectively ruled out by using physical or administrative controls to prevent an 162 
impact scenario from being possible. 163 
2. We need to determine the acceptable level of risk likelihood for a high explosive (HE) 164 
reaction, given any of the set of credible impacts that remain after the implementation of 165 
these physical and administrative controls. 166 
3. We need to assess, using a combination of the best experimental and modeling tools 167 
available, the likelihood of HE reaction for each impact scenario, and whether the assessed 168 
likelihood is lower than the allowable. 169 
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4. We need to establish a path forward to improve our ability to assess the HE impacts and 170 
reaction likelihoods, with a case built on the relative benefits of experiments, model 171 
development, or both. 172 
5. We need to use the Benefit/Cost Ratio to trade off the cost of these multi-dimensional 173 
aspects against cost. 174 
 175 
The CTQ elements named above all remain to be traded off against each other and against 176 
cost. We will show one way to quantify the challenges faced above as part of a DMADV style 177 
implementation of DFSS. We will then attempt to quantify each of the four challenges, and 178 
generate suitable metrics for DFSS that are compatible in the same quantitative design trade space, 179 
and compatible with our own Design Safety Standards (DSS) already in use (Murray et al, 2004). 180 
The main output of this trade space will be to quantify the options for the path forward regarding 181 
investments in experiments and models to assess the likelihood of HE reaction. Since R&D can go 182 
on “forever”, it is important to have measures of benefit and cost to assure sponsors (in this case 183 
the Congress and the taxpayers) that we have criteria for knowing when more R&D is worthwhile, 184 
and when to stop. 185 
We will capture the quantitative aspects of our R&D benefit / cost analysis as a single metric 186 
(the BCR or its predecessors) compiled from the multi-dimensional trade space. A simple 187 
example, based on a recently completed automotive design study, will help to illustrate the 188 
elements and how they lead to a single scalar metric indicator of the best path forward. 189 
4 Example: Quantifying Multi-Dimensional Trade Space 190 
 191 
First, we will clarify what is meant by metrics for DFSS that are compatible in the same 192 
quantitative design trade space. We can do this by revisiting a recent example of “exhaust system 193 
manifold development through multi-attribute system design optimization”, which is the title of 194 
the recent work by (Usan et al, 2005). We will revisit this work and give an example of one way to 195 
construct a set of metrics that can condense a Pareto frontier of Multi-disciplinary Design 196 
Optimization (MDO) into a single decision quantity, the Benefit / Cost Ratio (BCR). The BCR 197 
will be useful when we return to the DFSS and DCOV analysis for the HE impact safety as well.  198 
(Usan et al, 2005) discuss MDO in terms of an automotive maniverter (see Figure 3; exhaust 199 
manifold with catalytic converter). An automotive exhaust system carries exhaust gases from the 200 
engine’s combustion chamber to the atmosphere. Exhaust gases typically leave the engine in a cast 201 
or tubular manifold, then through a catalytic converter, and then through a silencing sub-system 202 
before exiting through the tailpipe. Chemical reactions inside the catalytic converter change most 203 
of the hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide produced by the engine into water vapor and carbon 204 
dioxide, while the muffler attenuates the noise produced by the engine. Exhaust passages from 205 
each port in the engine enter the exhaust manifold, and then join into a common single passage 206 
before they reach the manifold flange. An exhaust pipe is connected to the exhaust manifold 207 
flange. Sometimes, a catalytic converter is moved upstream from the traditional underfloor 208 
position and is placed just after the point where pipes coming out of the engine ports join. This 209 
particular position is selected in order to achieve a reduction in the converter warm up time after 210 
the engine is cranked-up and consequently to speed-up the start of pollutant conversion. In this 211 
case, quite often the term “maniverter” (manifold+converter) is used. 212 
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(Usan et al, 2005) present an excellent discussion on the need for more efficient product 213 
development activities. They choose design options and tradeoffs for a specific maniverter as an 214 
example requiring MDO integration. Four metrics are chosen (same as the number of HE impact 215 
safety design engineering challenges we choose), plus maniverter cost. These metrics comprise: 216 
 217 
1. F1, the first natural frequency of the maniverter (important for noise, vibration and 218 
harshness (NVH), and also related failure potential. Units are inverse time. 219 
2. TIN, Weighted average catalytic converter inlet temperature (important for converter 220 
efficiency). Units are degrees C. 221 
3. Mm, maniverter mass (important for vehicle performance: acceleration, fuel mileage, 222 
handling). Units are grams. 223 
4. TPI, the Torque Performance Index (important for acceleration and driveability). TPI is 224 
unitless, defined as TPI=(µT/σT)2, where µT=Mean Torque output over the driving range, 225 
and σT=the standard deviation of torque output over that range. This TPI is simply the 226 
signal-to-noise or SN ratio as defined by (Taguchi, 1987). 227 
5. $C, maniverter Cost (trades off against the above). Units are Euros, or dollars in this work. 228 
 229 
Prior to normalization, each of these metrics has different 230 
units, but a scalar value.  In (Usan et al, 2005), a rapid, highly 231 
automated design tool set is used to converge on an example set of 232 
twelve final design choices for the maniverter. The values for F1, 233 
TIN, Mm, TPI, and $C for each of these twelve designs (a thru l) 234 
are presented as a color “Rainbow Plot” in (Usan et al, 2005). A 235 
similar plot is shown in gray scale in Figure 4, where darker gray 236 
is a better choice and lighter gray is a worse choice. Usan et al. 237 
choose design ‘b’ as the 1st choice, and also note some 2nd and 3rd 238 
choice suggestions. These choices are somewhat intuitive from the 239 
rainbow plot, but remain subjective due to the incompatible units 240 
of the five metrics.  241 
We can show the multi-dimensional Pareto frontier with the 242 
actual numbers, as shown in Table 1, again after (Usan et al, 2005). It is perhaps even less clear 243 
how to choose the preferred design from this maze of numbers, all with different units. In Table 1, 244 
the “Base” design is shown as well as the twelve excursions. Careful study of the numbers will 245 
likely result in an intuitive feel that Design ‘b’ is in fact quite preferable to the base design. Some 246 
type of normalization must be performed to compare across the 5 metrics. Weighting factors are 247 
used in (Usan et al, 2005) resulting in a dimensionless metric with a scale as shown in Figure 4. 248 
 249 
 
Figure 3. Example of 
exhaust maniverter 
(manifold plus converter).
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 250 
Figure 4. Pareto Data “Qualitative Rainbow Plot”. Color rainbow of (Usan et al, 2005) converted 251 
to the gray scale as shown by the shading key to the right of the table. 252 
 253 
 254 
As an alternative to this dimensionless normalization, we will attempt to capture the multi-255 
dimensional nature of the maniverter design tradeoffs with a single Benefit / Cost Ratio (BCR). 256 
We will present only a scalar BCR for each design excursion in this example. We used the 257 
following assumptions and sources to convert each metric to a dollar $B basis: 258 
 259 
F1: We assume that vibration failure due to F1 would go as (1/F1)2. This means practically, as the 260 
numbers in Table 1 show, that most of the designs would incur a negligible penalty in benefit $B 261 
except for the low-F1 designs ‘a’ and ‘f’. If we choose a constant such that about a $2000 repair 262 
and customer cost is incurred for design ‘a’ and ‘f’, the other designs suffer a negative $B that is 263 
small in comparison. 264 
 265 
TIN: We assumed an average grams-per-mile emissions and social costs from various sources 266 
including (Teller et al, 1997), (Matthews, 2000), (DOE, 1997), (EPA, 1999), and (Kiely, 1997). 267 
We further postulate for this example study a decrease in emissions with higher TIN, with an 268 
average of a 1% decrease in emissions per 20oC increase in TIN above 800oC, per (Shamim et al, 269 
1999) and assume this as a linear relationship. This gives a $B for lower social cost of emissions, 270 
assumed over a 120,000 mile vehicle life. 271 
 272 
Mm, grams. We assumed a weight penalty of about $4/lb. or $0.009/gm. 273 
 274 
TPI: We postulate a constant σΤ = 10 ft-lb torque, and then calculate the gain in mean torque 275 
µΤ  from the reported values of TPI. We assign a value of $B = $20 per ft-lb of mean torque. This 276 
is a fairly conservative (low) value compared to the retail market demand, but we will still see that 277 
TPI emerges as the dominant factor in the BCR analysis. 278 
 279 
$C: We converted the cost reported in (Usan et al, 2005) from Euros to dollars at $1.30 per Euro. 280 
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 281 
We can now compute the $B for each of the 5 282 
metrics and 12 designs in Table 1. These are 283 
shown in Table 2, along with the BCR, the sum 284 
of the four $B divided by $C for each design. 285 
Also shown in Table 2 are the top few choices 286 
for the maniverter design, based on 287 
BCR=$B/$C, or on Net $B-$C, as well as the 288 
choices from (Usan et al, 2005). Judgment in 289 
looking at the individual values plays an 290 
important role in design choice. The estimates 291 
we used in converting the metrics F1, TIN, Mm, 292 
and TPI to a dollar benefit, while reasonable, are 293 
certainly not of the pedigree desired for a design 294 
decision; we simply provide these for an 295 
example. In reality, assigning dollar values to the costs and benefits in BCR should receive the 296 
same diligence and probabilistic considerations (Leopoulos et al, 2003) as the rest of the DFSS 297 
aspects. The BCR offers a way to quantitatively capture this information as a scalar. Close 298 
examination of Table 2 shows how the BCR or Net $B can provide a quantitative scalar 299 
assessment of the design options, with the top few choices marked as ‘1’, ‘2’, or ‘3’ etc. These 300 
compare well (but not identically) to the choices suggested in (Usan et al, 2005) from their Pareto 301 
Rainbow charts. Either BCR or Net $B or both could be viewed as a scalar roll up of CTQ metrics. 302 
Figure 5 conveys a histogram of the total BCR; the choices for maximum BCR are now 303 
obvious. The histogram style presentation as in Figure 3 makes quantified expression of the “best 304 
design choices” obvious; if for some reason Design ‘b’ were rejected, the next best choices based 305 
on BCR are obvious  too. If detail is desired, the $B and $C values in Table 2 can be compared or 306 
examined in graphical form to provide more detail as to which components of the design  are 307 
dominating the final outcome.  308 
 309 
Table 2. Pareto data converted to $B and $C, with total BCR for each design. 310 
 311 
 312 
Table 1.  
Pareto data “Quantitative Rainbow Plot”.
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Figure 5. Total BCR of the BASE design and the twelve design options (a through l). Raw data 314 
from (Usan et al, 2005); BCR analysis from this work. 315 
 316 
5 Revisit of Explosive Impact Safety with DFSS / DMADV 317 
Given the discussion above of our views on DFSS, use of the BCR, and the Maniverter 318 
example of converting a multi-dimensional design frontier into a scalar, let revisit, from a DFSS 319 
perspective, the high explosive impact safety issue as discussed in (Nitta et al, 2004) and look at 320 
the five CTQ issues we raised for this issue at the start of Section 3: 321 
 322 
1. Using the best combination of administrative and physical controls available to 323 
prevent scenarios where an HE impact is even possible leaves us with the 324 
necessity to assess likelihood of impact for a set of impact conditions similar to 325 
the impactors shown in Figure 6. 326 
2. The overall assessed likelihood of the combination of an HE impact occurring 327 
and leading to a reaction must be less than 10-n where n >> 6; this overall 328 
allowable puts us clearly into DFSS process thinking. Use of administrative and 329 
physical controls leaves us with the requirement to assess that the likelihood of 330 
reaction, given that an impact occurs, might be, for example, less than 10-2. 331 
3. Given this example “requirement”, we need to assess, with models and 332 
experiments, the types of impacts shown in Figure 6, and see if the probability of 333 
“failure” (i.e., any HE reaction) is indeed less than 10-2, or in other words that the 334 
Reliability of seeing no HE reaction in this hypothetical case is R> (1-Pfail) or 335 
R>0.99. 336 
4. We will discuss the nature of the measures used to assess the HE impact and 337 
potential for reactions against this hypothetical example requirement of R>0.99, 338 
and how the data and models available as shown in (Nitta et al, 2004) might be 339 
augmented to allow us to improve the robustness of our assessment that we meet 340 
the R>0.99 criteria we chose for the example of this work. 341 
5. Use of the Benefit / Cost Ratio (BCR) to balance the benefits of more research 342 
investment for risk reduction against the cost of those research investments. A 343 
high BCR can defend our research funds from unwarranted raids at budget time; 344 
a low BCR says we should move on to a new research area or a new scenario. 345 
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 346 
 In the analysis of (Nitta et al, 2004), we used a more conservative (harsh) measure of 347 
model-assessed “likelihood” of HE reaction. For example, for the Steven 30mm impactor shown 348 
in Figure 6, with the explosive type PBX 9404, our simple analytical regression model assessed a 349 
reaction likelihood of 350 
 351 
Lfail = 0.252 352 
 353 
Since our requirement for this example is Pfail < 0.01, it appears that we are using a fairly 354 
harsh metric for assessment of failure, or that our model needs 355 
improvement, or that we need more experimental data (or 356 
some combination of the above). If the same model and data 357 
that generated the Lfail=0.252 (the scenario in Table III of Nitta 358 
et al, 2004) were used to assess Pfail, we would would assess a 359 
nominal reliability for avoiding an HE reaction of: 360 
 361 
 β = Reliability Index = RI = 2.88, Reliability RNoRxn=0.9980 362 
 363 
 Pfail = 1 - RNoRxn  = 0.0020 364 
 365 
This Pfail, expressed as the complement of mean assessed 366 
reliability, clearly meets our Pfail < 0.01 requirement.  367 
 368 
We can also examine this example “model assessed 369 
reliability” at a fairly high confidence level of 3 standard 370 
deviations or 3σ, and if we assess reliability using the estimate 371 
of experimental uncertainty only (1σ ~ 2 m/s in impact 372 
velocity needed for an HE reaction) we obtain: 373 
 374 
β = Reliability Index = RI = 3.31, Reliability RNoRxn=0.9995 375 
 376 
 Pfail = 1 - RNoRxn  = 0.0005 377 
 378 
This Pfail, expressed as the complement of mean assessed 379 
reliability, again clearly meets our Pfail < 0.01 requirement.  380 
 381 
 382 
 383 
If we look back at the three main DFSS points raised in 384 
the introduction, we can note that: 385 
 386 
1. We have shown that the DFSS can quantify aspects 387 
of our judgment. We chose an example Pfail<0.01 388 
criteria and showed that with a Reliability method 389 
based either on mean reliability, or on reliability 390 
that considers available experimental variability 391 
 
Figure 6. Impact assembly 
(Switzer et al, 2003) 
containing flat cylinder of 
high explosive and 
surrounding components, and 
range of representative 
impactors. Our example uses 
the original “Steven” 
impactor, with the fully 
rounded (30mm radius) head. 
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information only, we can meet this example requirement. 392 
2. If we use the full model based assessment as in (Nitta et al, 2004), we can only assess 393 
Lfail=0.252. This says that our model is not yet adequate to assess a full range of impact 394 
scenarios that may be far from our experimental data, even though we meet the CTQ 395 
measure of Pfail<0.010 using the experimental data locally or using a mean reliability 396 
measure. This leads to our third point. 397 
3. We showed that DFSS is a process that needs periodic revisit. In addition to the 398 
DMADV steps of Define, Measure, Analyze, Design, Verify, a step called “O” or 399 
“Optimize” is often added to form a DMADOV implementation of DFSS. For 400 
example, if our HE impact scenarios begin to stray very far from the experimental data, 401 
we can no longer rely on the mean reliability or variability based Pfail~0.001, and must 402 
seek model and experimental augmentations to enable us to reach a model-assessed 403 
Lfail < 0.01 for any new HE impact scenarios far from the database. In (Nitta et al, 404 
2004), we generated estimates of the BCR for improving our impact models and 405 
obtaining more data. A range from BCR=7 to BCR=42 was achieved. Viewed as a 406 
revisit of DFSS, this is a way to quantify the value – and hence recommend a path 407 
forward – for more research on explosive reactions during impact. 408 
6 Conclusions 409 
We showed how to work with single metrics for DFSS (BCR or equivalent) to clarify a 410 
quantitative path forward. With conversion of multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional Pareto 411 
frontier metrics into a single BCR metric, clear choices emerged for the maniverter example. 412 
Regarding the safety example and the data and model for high explosive (HE) reaction on impact, 413 
quantitative justification for the path forward emerged – this time, with a linkage to the reliability 414 
R and Pfail = 1 – R elements so closely linked to our own LLNL Design Safety Standards and risk-415 
based design requirements. More R&D for HE impact safety is an obvious thing to do, but we now 416 
have a way, using DFSS and associated metrics like the BCR, to quantify the value of this R&D, 417 
what we can gain, and when we will reach the “good enough” point and transition from Design 418 
For Six Sigma and DMADOV into Six-Sigma and DMAIC. 419 
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